The Pro-Israel Lobby, the United States, and the Iran Nuclear Deal: The Pro-Israel Lobby’s Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy by Cutter, Gabriel Thomas
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE PRO-ISRAEL LOBBY, THE UNITED STATES, AND 
THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL: THE PRO-ISRAEL LOBBY’S 
INFLUENCE ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
GABRIEL CUTTER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A THESIS 
 
Presented to the Department of Political Science 
and the Robert D. Clark Honors College  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Bachelor of Arts 
 
June 2019 
  
ii 
 
An Abstract of the Thesis of 
Gabriel Cutter for the degree of Bachelor of Arts 
in the Department of Political Science to be taken June 2019 
 
 
Title:  The Pro-Israel Lobby, The United States, and the Iran Nuclear Deal: The pro-
Israel Lobby’s Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy 
 
 
 
 
Approved: _______________________________________ 
 
Dr. Jane Cramer 
 
The pro-Israel lobby has been in the spotlight in recent political controversies, 
but does the pro-Israel lobby actually influence foreign policy decisions? Using factors 
pulled from literature about the influence of ethnic minority interest groups on foreign 
policy, I evaluate the influence of the pro-Israel lobby on foreign policy. Ultimately, I 
find that the pro-Israel lobby wields both monetary and political power to influence 
foreign policy making in the United States. I then continue with my analysis by 
evaluating whether the pro-Israel lobby was involved in the decision to leave the Iran 
Nuclear Deal. While the pro-Israel lobby was unable to prevent President Obama from 
dropping economic sanctions against Iran, it was able to convince President Trump to 
leave the deal.  
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Does the pro-Israel Lobby Influence U.S. Foreign Policy? 
I had two primary research questions: Has the pro-Israel lobby influenced U.S. 
foreign policy decisions? Specifically, what influence can be found in regard to the U.S. 
decision to leave the Iran Nuclear Deal? My research examines four factors that have 
been compiled by Trevor Rubenzer, a scholar who studies ethnic minority interest 
groups. These factors are used to evaluate the influence of ethnic minority interest 
groups on foreign policy decisions. I will show the influence of the pro-Israel lobby on 
foreign policy by applying the four factors to the pro-Israel lobby. Next, I will examine 
whether there is any current evidence of the pro-Israel lobby influencing the U.S. 
departure from the Iran Nuclear Deal. 
Talking about the “pro-Israel lobby” instead of the “Israel lobby” 
I will use the term “pro-Israel lobby” instead of the term “Israel lobby,” which is 
used in other literature, to characterize U.S. interest groups and individuals that support 
the relationship between the U.S. and Israel. Use of the term “Israel lobby” confuses the 
purpose and origins of pro-Israel interest groups in the United States. The “Israel 
lobby,” as defined by Mearsheimer and Walt1, is over-expansive and includes 
government officials not part of the formal pro-Israel lobby.2 Even though all 
government officials who support Israel are not necessarily included in Mearsheimer 
                                                        
1 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy 
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 112–13. 
2 Robert Lieberman, “The ‘Israel Lobby’ and American Politics,” Perspectives on 
Politics 7, no. 2 (2019): 241, 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/870004471/fulltextPDF/E76A41441FD14
306PQ/1?accountid=14698. 
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and Walt’s definition3, their definition of the “Israel lobby” is unclear.4 Instead of 
limiting the definition of the “Israel lobby,” Mearsheimer and Walt include in their 
definition any individual or organization that has the same political agenda, to further 
the interests of Israel.5 
The “Israel lobby” could also be interpreted as a lobby that is entirely consistent 
with the interests of Israel. This is not always the case with pro-Israel interest groups in 
the United States. These interest groups are not permitted to have direct ties or 
communication with the state of Israel, unless they choose to register as a foreign lobby 
group. Additionally, pro-Israel interest groups do not always support policies that are 
completely consistent with what the government of Israel wants. While pro-Israel 
interest groups support some policies that are often consistent with Israeli interests, this 
relationship is not demonstrative of the current state of the pro-Israel lobby. Therefore, 
the term “pro-Israel lobby” is more consistent with the structure and purpose of pro-
Israel interest groups within the United States. 6 
                                                        
3 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Blind Man and the Elephant in the 
Room: Robert Lieberman and the Israel Lobby,” Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 2 
(2009): 262, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-
politics/article/blind-man-and-the-elephant-in-the-room-robert-lieberman-and-
the-israel-lobby/BC9C61C0F2089104EC6C3F89D5F7089D. 
4 Lieberman, “The ‘Israel Lobby’ and American Politics,” 241. 
5 Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 112–13. 
6 While Mearsheimer and Walt use the term “Israel lobby,” they concede that the 
term “Israel lobby” is more misleading and not entirely accurate. They use “Israel 
lobby” for the purpose of matching the terminology with other widely known 
lobbies, such as the “gun lobby.” 
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Defining the pro-Israel lobby 
The pro-Israel lobby, while not a foreign lobby in the U.S.,7 promotes policies 
that they believe to be beneficial to the state of Israel. Like most lobby groups, they use 
the influence of money and other political means to strategically support or undermine 
influential members of Congress. 
Furthermore, the pro-Israel lobby is sometimes not a unitary interest group. The 
pro-Israel lobby consists of interest groups and individuals that look to further the 
interests of Israel by actively attempting to influence legislation and discourse within 
the United States. Under my definition, the lobby includes individual donors, PACs, and 
interest groups that help encourage pro-Israel policies. As I will explain later, there are 
certain issues that create major divisions between the members of the pro-Israel lobby. 
Just like the different approaches to promoting U.S. interests, exemplified by political 
parties in the U.S., there are different ways to promote the interests of Israel. Divisive 
issues like the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people and the U.S. 
involvement in the Iran Nuclear deal have created rifts within the pro-Israel lobby. 
Thus, today, it cannot be assumed that the pro-Israel lobby is centrally controlled or 
always unified in its message. 
My research will look at formal groups within the pro-Israel lobby to determine 
the influence of the lobby as a whole. The interest groups, within the pro-Israel lobby, 
that I will primarily address in my analysis are the American Israel Public Affairs 
                                                        
7 Foreign lobbies are lobbies or interest groups that are controlled or directly 
affiliated with a foreign government. Foreign lobbies are required to register with 
the U.S. government under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. 
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Committee and J-Street.8 AIPAC is one of the more well-known interest groups in the 
United States. While AIPAC does not directly contribute to any campaign, it does pair 
prospective donors and lobbying groups with campaigns or legislators.9 AIPAC has 
typically been more conservative and aligned most of its support with the Likud party, 
the conservative controlling party of Israel.  
Alternatively, J-Street is one of the more well-known liberal interest groups 
within the pro-Israel lobby. In recent years it has expanded in power and influence 
significantly. Since 2008, J-Street has been one of the top contributors from the pro-
Israel lobby.10 I use these two interest groups to characterize the pro-Israel lobby 
because they are two of the larger, well-known interest groups within the lobby and 
they demonstrate the expanse of political ideology within the lobby.11 
Why it is not anti-Semitic to talk about the pro-Israel lobby 
Before I begin my analysis, I would like to disclose that my analysis is not 
meant to be critical of the Jewish people or their religion. I understand that there are 
                                                        
8 These interest groups are not the only members of the pro-Israel lobby. There are 
various other groups that are also quite influential such as Christians United for 
Israel and the Conference of Presidents. 
9Stephen M. Walt, “How (and How Not) to Talk About the Israel Lobby,” Foreign 
Affairs, March 15, 2019. 
10 Center for Responsive Politics, “Pro-Israel: Top Contributors to Federal 
Candidates, Parties, and Outside Groups | OpenSecrets,” accessed April 18, 2019, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/contrib.php?ind=Q05&Bkdn=Source&cy
cle=2008. 
11 Other authors have chosen J-Street and AIPAC to categorize the pro-Israel lobby; 
see, Amy B. Becker, “Politics Versus Place? The Relative Influence of Partisanship, 
Ideology, and Connection With Israel on Support for the Iran Nuclear Agreement,” 
International Journal of Public Opinion Research, August 6, 2016, edw023, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edw023. 
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predominant and dangerous stereotypes around Jewish power and influence. 
Specifically, there is no part of my analysis that questions the legitimacy of Israel’s 
existence. None of my analysis is meant to criticize the Jewish culture or religion. My 
research is meant to focus on the pro-Israel lobby, whose primary purpose is to promote 
policies beneficial to Israel within the United States. The pro-Israel lobby does not 
represent the state of Israel or the Jewish people as a whole. Instead, it is characterized 
by individuals, businesses, and organizations that want to see the enactment of policies 
that they believe are beneficial to Israel and the relationship between the U.S. and 
Israel. This is a study of the influence of a political lobby, not the influence of a religion 
or ethnic group. 
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Prior Discourse About the Pro-Israel lobby and Ethnic Minority 
Interest Groups 
My analysis required me to consider two sources of discourse surrounding the 
pro-Israel lobby: the general influence of the pro-Israel lobby and the influence of 
ethnic groups on U.S. foreign policy. The problem with some of the literature 
surrounding the influence of the pro-Israel lobby is that it does not rely on a defined 
framework when evaluating the influence of the pro-Israel lobby. While studies about 
the influence of ethnic groups on U.S. foreign policy have provided these frameworks, 
there are multiple competing factors that have been defined by the literature. 
Previous discourse about the influence of the pro-Israel lobby in the U.S. 
One of the earlier critiques of the pro-Israel lobby was written by a former 
congressman, Paul Findley.12 His narrative was highly critical of the pro-Israel lobby 
and provided various examples of influence of the pro-Israel lobby. One example 
Findley provided was the incident with the USS Liberty, an attack on a U.S. ship by 
Israeli planes and submarines. He contended that the supposed cover-up of this incident 
led to further harm with another incident involving the USS Pueblo, whose 
crewmembers were captured by North Korea.13 He primarily relied on his own 
experience in Congress and the testimonies of other members of Congress to create a 
                                                        
12 Paul Findley, They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel’s 
Lobby, Third (Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2003), 
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uoregon/reader.action?docID=1273936. 
13 Findley, 196. 
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critical narrative about the influence of the pro-Israel lobby. However, there was no 
theoretical framework presented or used to evaluate his claims. 
Mearsheimer and Walt furthered the idea that U.S. support of Israel is not 
wholly rational but instead influenced substantially by the Israel lobby. They divided 
the rationale for supporting Israel into two categories: strategic and moral. Mearsheimer 
and Walt claim that the initial support of Israel was strategic.14 The Cold War was in 
full swing following the founding of Israel in 1948 and the U.S. was in an existential 
war with the U.S.S.R. and its allies. Due to Israel’s recent founding, Israel was seen as a 
weak point in the Middle East that could potentially fall to the spread of communism.15 
During the Kennedy administration, the U.S.S.R. gave increased aid to the bordering 
states of Iraq, Egypt, and Syria; thus, the U.S. felt that Israel could be a strategic asset 
that would help prevent the spread of Communism. This, supposedly, was the source of 
the viewpoint that Israel is a strategic ally in the Middle East. 
While Mearsheimer and Walt indicate that Israel was initially a strategic asset, 
they contest that it still remains a strategic asset in the Middle East. They introduce 
several examples of situations where the U.S. may not have acted in its own self-
interest, but instead remained too loyal to its ally in the Middle East. 16  
 One example that Mearsheimer and Walt introduce is the seemingly irrational 
maintenance of the United States’ alliance with Israel following the fall of the U.S.S.R. 
The alliance with Israel was initially intended to help contain the spread of Communism 
                                                        
14 Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 51. 
15 Mearsheimer and Walt, 51. 
16 Mearsheimer and Walt, 58, 60, 70, 75. 
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in the Middle East; however, according to Mearsheimer and Walt, there was no longer a 
justification to remain such strong allies. If anything, they argue, Israel was more of a 
liability.17 While this may not have been apparent at the time, U.S. support of Israel 
may have resulted in anti-American sentiment that still endures today in many parts of 
the Middle East. The support of Israel’s suppression of Palestine further increased the 
hatred of the U.S. Following this logic, the U.S. should not have remained such a 
devoted supporter of Israel following the end of the Cold War because Israel was no 
longer as strategically useful. 
Another justification that Mearsheimer and Walt address is the moral 
justification for supporting Israel. The moral case for supporting Israel, according to 
Mearsheimer and Walt, rests on Israel’s moral and democratic nature. The U.S. has 
emphasized the spread of democracy as one of its key foreign policies. Israel is one of 
the few democracies that exist in the Middle East. Supposedly, Israel is weak and needs 
protection from enemy countries that surround it. Also, Israel claims the moral high 
ground, even in the disputes with Palestine. According to some, the violence between 
Palestinians and Israel was initiated by the Palestinians when they rejected a peace offer 
in 2000.18 
Mearsheimer and Walt disagree with the moral case for Israel and believe that 
there is something more than a moral compass that is influencing unconditional support 
for Israel. While they do agree that the existence of Israel is worth defending, they do 
not feel its existence is currently threatened and, thus, deserves unconditional support 
                                                        
17 Mearsheimer and Walt, 58. 
18 Mearsheimer and Walt, 79. 
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from the United States. Therefore, Mearsheimer and Walt conclude that the Israel 
Lobby must be more powerful than it has usually been accredited and is heavily 
influential on U.S. foreign policy. 
Although Mearsheimer and Walt are well known and respected in the field of 
political science, they faced substantial criticism for their critical analysis of the Israel 
Lobby and its alleged power in the United States. Robert Lieberman, another prominent 
political scientist, authored a full critique of Mearsheimer and Walt’s book. 
Specifically, he focused on the lack of the proposed causality between the Israel Lobby 
and U.S. foreign policy.19 Additionally, Lieberman criticized the lack of variation in the 
data and case studies that Mearsheimer and Walt selected. He believes that there are 
alternate case studies that were left out that would have contradicted some of their 
findings. Mostly, Lieberman argues that Mearsheimer and Walt left out situations with 
varying levels of pressure by the Israel lobby and the corresponding foreign policy.20 
In regard to the Israel Lobby’s influence in the United States, Lieberman stated 
that it was too ambiguous to determine whether the lobbying by the Israel Lobby was 
actually influential on policy change. In some instances, congressional candidates who 
had received nearly $250,000 in contributions from pro-Israel groups were still unable 
to win seats.21 This demonstrates that the Israel Lobby is not omnipotent and may not be 
as influential as Mearsheimer and Walt propose. Also, according to Lieberman, total 
contributions in congressional election cycles have steadily increased while 
                                                        
19 Lieberman, “The ‘Israel Lobby’ and American Politics,” 249. 
20 Lieberman, 250. 
21 Lieberman, 244. 
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contributions by pro-Israel groups have remained steady.22 Comparatively, the Israel 
Lobby may not be spending as much as it sounds. “[I]t is far from clear that even these 
large-sounding amounts of money are enough to be decisive in increasingly expansive 
congressional elections, especially for Senate seats.”23 Lieberman casts doubt on the 
Mearsheimer and Walt’s proposal of an influential pro-Israel lobby. 
Subsequently, Mearsheimer and Walt responded to this criticism. First, they 
responded to the methods they used for their research in determining influence of the 
Israel Lobby: 
One cannot measure the influence of an interest group simply by looking 
at whether it “won” or “lost” a particular policy dispute. The real 
question is what the outcome would have been had interest group 
pressure been absent. After all, an interest group may lose a specific 
policy battle but still force policymakers to water down their goals or 
expend lots of political capital in order to overcome its opposition. In 
short, there is no simple linear relationship between “lobbying activities” 
and “policy outcomes” in the real world; thus gauging a lobby’s clout 
requires paying careful attention to the process by which decisions and 
outcomes were reached.24 
Similar to my later analysis surrounding the Iran Nuclear Deal, there is no single way to 
measure influence. Looking at interest groups, whether a candidate wins or loses may 
not be a complete indication of the interest group’s influence. Also, as I discuss later, 
interest groups can influence policy by political means other than just monetary 
donations and lobbying. 
 Next, Mearsheimer and Walt respond to Lieberman’s criticism of the causality 
they try to demonstrate in their analysis. Lieberman pointed out that a single aspect of 
                                                        
22 Lieberman, 244. 
23 Lieberman, 244. 
24 Mearsheimer and Walt, “The Blind Man and the Elephant in the Room: Robert 
Lieberman and the Israel Lobby,” 260. 
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an interest group’s strategy to influence legislation could not be the sole factor in 
changing legislation and public opinion. Mearsheimer and Walt agree and proceed to 
demonstrate how a combination of Jewish voters, lobbying, and influencing public 
discourse can affect policy. In regard to lobbying, much of campaign funds come from 
individuals. These individuals are often times not required to report their ethnicity or 
religion so there is no way to really see the total amount of funds donated on behalf of 
the “Israel Lobby.” These individual donations would be in addition to the funding by 
PACs that must be reported.25 
 Mearsheimer and Walt continue by arguing that Jewish voting compounds the 
influence of the Israel Lobby. They claim that the Jewish vote can be a swing vote in 
some states that have substantial Jewish populations because there is no obvious party 
loyalty.26 However, even in states that have a relatively large Jewish population, like 
New York, they still only make up about 7% of the state.27 In the United States, Jews 
comprise of only 2% of the entire population.28 This is hardly a significant percentage 
of the population to drastically affect the outcome of national elections. Additionally, it 
cannot be assumed that all Jews would support pro-Israel policies. As I discuss later, 
there is a growing resistance, within the younger generation of Jews, to U.S. support of 
                                                        
25 Mearsheimer and Walt, 266. 
26 Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 163. 
27 Pew Research Center, “Religion in America: U.S. Religious Data, Demographics 
and Statistics | Pew Research Center,” 2019, 
https://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/religious-
tradition/jewish/#social-and-political-views. 
28 Pew Research Center, “Israel and the U.S. Are Home to More Than Four-Fifths of 
the World’s Jews | Pew Research Center,” 2013, 
https://www.pewforum.org/2013/03/20/israel-and-the-us-are-home-to-more-
than-fourfifths-of-the-worlds-jews/. 
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Israel. Therefore, the concept that the sheer number of Jewish Americans could 
influence elections and consequently influence foreign policy to be more favorable to 
Israel is far-fetched.  
 While Mearsheimer and Walt provide a detailed and supported analysis of the 
pro-Israel lobby’s influence, there does not appear to be a consistent method of analysis. 
Compared to other methods of analysis, they do not rely on a strict framework for their 
analysis.29 Instead, their analysis depends primarily on the narratives of others who 
support their view of the pro-Israel lobby. 
Gauging the factors of influence for ethnic minority interest groups 
The other body of literature important to my research is the research on ethnic 
minority interest groups; specifically, their influence on foreign policy. In recent years, 
the various factors that determine the influence of these interest groups have been 
distilled into a few important indicators of influence over foreign policy. 
Looking first at the development of the factors of influence, in a case study 
about the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), Patrick Haney and Walt 
Vanderbush introduced the factors that are typically used to determine the influence of 
ethnic minority interest groups. Specifically, they focused on money, lobbying ability, 
and unity of both the organization and its constituency.30 They ultimately found that 
their case study of CANF reinforced the validity of the factors used to examine 
                                                        
29 See Lieberman, “The ‘Israel Lobby’ and American Politics.” 
30 Patrick Haney, The Cuban Embargo : Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy 
(University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 48, 
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uoregon/reader.action?docID=2038882#. 
  
13 
 
influence of ethnic minority lobbies. These factors had previously been synthesized 
from other past studies of ethnic minority lobbying groups.31  
Trevor Rubenzer compiled and analyzed the current factors that are used 
throughout existing research. There are eleven factors that Rubenzer identified in his 
research that indicate an interest group’s influence on foreign policy: whether an ethnic 
minority interest group is assimilated, unified, organized, politically active, numerous; 
and has public support, ties to its home country, substantial political opposition, 
financial resources, a focused message, and alliances with other interest groups.32 In his 
expansive literature review, Rubenzer found two factors that were most referenced and 
relevant to analysis: the extent of political involvement with foreign policy and the 
organizational strength of the lobby.33 These factors have been used by other authors to 
describe the basic factors that should be required when analyzing the influence of ethnic 
minority lobbies on foreign policy.34  
                                                        
31 See Abdul Aziz. Said, Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy (Praeger Publishers, 1977); 
Martin Weil, “Can the Blacks Do for Africa What the Jews Did for Israel?,” Foreign 
Policy, no. 15 (1974): 109, https://doi.org/10.2307/1147933. 
32 Trevor Rubenzer, “Ethnic Minority Interest Group Attributes and U.S. Foreign 
Policy Influence: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis,” Foreign Policy Analysis 4, no. 
2 (2008): 169–85. 
33 Rubenzer, 183. 
34 See Becker, “Politics Versus Place? The Relative Influence of Partisanship, 
Ideology, and Connection With Israel on Support for the Iran Nuclear Agreement”; 
Maria Koinova, “Sustained vs Episodic Mobilization among Conflict-Generated 
Diasporas,” International Political Science Review 37, no. 4 (2016): 500–516, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512115591641; Elena Chadova-Devlen, “Whose 
Interests? US-Russian Foreign Policy Controversies in Russian American Ethnic 
Press,” International Studies Perspectives 15, no. 1 (February 2014): 36–53, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/insp.12011; Liat Radcliffe Ross, “Muslim Interest Groups 
and Foreign Policy in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom: Identity, 
Interests, and Action,” Foreign Policy Analysis 9, no. 3 (July 2013): 287–306, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2012.00186.x. 
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Evaluating the Influence of the Pro-Israel lobby Regarding U.S. 
Foreign Policy 
Relying on Rubenzer’s factors and two additional factors, I will use four factors 
to determine the influence of the pro-Israel lobby in the United States: political 
involvement with foreign policy, political opposition, organizational strength, and 
political unity. While there are eleven total factors included by Rubenzer in his 
literature analysis, there are only four that had substantial supporting evidence and 
could be applied to the pro-Israel lobby.35 Also, many of the factors could be 
incorporated into other factors. For example, financial resources can also be included 
when determining the organizational strength of an ethnic minority lobby. Rubenzer’s 
analysis concluded that there were two basic factors that should be required in every 
analysis of ethnic minority interest groups: involvement with foreign policy and 
organizational strength. However, Rubenzer explains that these factors can be combined 
with other factors: “My results suggest that political activity and organization are the 
key factors that determine the presence or absence of influence. In this sense, there may 
be multiple paths to influence…”36 Rubenzer’s conclusions suggest that his cardinal 
factors can be combined with other factors.  
                                                        
35 Not all of the factors in Rubenzer’s literature review are applicable to the pro-
Israel lobby. For example, whether the members of the pro-Israel lobby in the U.S. 
are able to identify with Israelis is not relevant to the influence of the pro-Israel 
lobby. The pro-Israel lobby does not always follow the interests of Israeli Jews. 
Thus, it is unimportant whether American Jews are able to identify with Israeli 
Jews. 
36 Rubenzer, “Ethnic Minority Interest Group Attributes and U.S. Foreign Policy 
Influence: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis,” 183. 
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 It is important to include both political opposition and unification with 
Rubenzer’s key factors when looking at the pro-Israel lobby. If there is significant 
political opposition to a lobby, it could struggle to pass policy due to open opposition 
and, thus, could be under increased scrutiny. This would make it far less effective, 
especially if key members of Congress, who a lobby was trying to influence, were 
openly opposed to the lobby. For example, the Cuban American National Foundation 
(CANF) was able to expand significantly because there was little opposition to the 
support of Cuban Americans by both Congress and the public.37  If there is not 
significant political opposition, a lobby can expand its influence significantly. 
Therefore, political unification is an important factor to include in the analysis of the 
pro-Israel lobby. 
Similar to political opposition, if there is a rift in a particular lobby it can 
undermine the purpose of the lobby. There can be multiple factions competing for 
different policies that they individually believe to be beneficial. For example, the unity 
within CANF was found to demonstrate how unity was effective as a factor of influence 
with ethnic minority interest groups. If there is not unity within a lobby it can have a 
negative effect on the message and influence on policy.38 Also, there have been recent 
divisions within the pro-Israel lobby, which makes unity a relevant factor. Thus, I will 
include these two factors with the two cardinal factors defined by Rubenzer. 
                                                        
37 Haney, The Cuban Embargo : Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy, 49. 
38 Haney, 48. 
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The pro-Israel lobby focuses primarily on foreign policy 
 The extent to which a lobby is involved with foreign policy is clearly key when 
determining the influence of a minority interest group on foreign policy. Looking at the 
pro-Israel lobby, the vast majority of issues it is concerned with relate to foreign policy; 
specifically, foreign policy that concerns Israel.39 This is made apparent with AIPAC’s 
website that includes various issues that it addresses. All of the issues listed are directly 
or indirectly related to foreign policy: ranging from Iran to the international boycott and 
divestment movement.40 J-Streets website mirrors many of the issues AIPAC lists on its 
website.41 The purpose of the pro-Israel lobby is to promote favorable U.S. foreign 
policy for Israel.  
Additionally, AIPAC often sponsors trips to Israel for new members of 
Congress and for other supporters.42 These trips are made to solidify the commitment to 
Israel and promote the relationship between the United States and Israel. Thus, the 
lobby is almost exclusively involved with issues of foreign policy because domestic 
U.S. policy has little to no effect on the interests of the state of Israel. 
The expansive organization and strength of the pro-Israel lobby 
 Whether a minority interest group is organizationally strong can be determined 
by the size, resources, and lobbying ability of the interest group. The size of an interest 
                                                        
39 Dennis. Jett, The Iran Nuclear Deal: Bombs, Bureaucrats, and Billionaires 
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group’s organization is usually determined by the number of members, employees, and 
offices. Resources and lobbying ability are usually shown through the organizations 
funding and ability to hire lobbyists.43 While the pro-Israel lobby consists of multiple 
interest groups, I will focus much of my analysis on two of the biggest players, J-Street 
and AIPAC. 
 Looking first at the size of J-Street, their main site claims they have 180,000 
members and 1,000 lay leaders. Instead of having main offices, like AIPAC, J-Street 
appears to have a more informal system where interested volunteers can contact lay 
leaders. Lay leaders not only serve as contacts for potential donors or volunteers, they 
also reach out to campaigns. Additionally, there are regional directors, similar to 
AIPAC’s regional offices, that also work with congressional campaigns. J-Street also 
claims to host the third-largest annual gathering of Jews in the U.S.44 
 Similar to J-Street, AIPAC claims to have more than 100,000 members and 
more than 400 staff members. Although, AIPAC is organized differently because it has 
established offices throughout the U.S. The offices allow AIPAC to reach out to 
campaigns directly and work with candidates to develop pro-Israel platforms.45 Many of 
its office are centered on the East coast. Compared to J-Street, AIPAC is more 
established throughout the U.S. with its various offices.46 However, combined, the two 
interest groups have an expansive network of supporters, offices, and staff members. 
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AIPAC has served as a template for other lobbying groups because of its 
organizational strength. AIPAC is structured into legally distinct entities that allow it to 
reap the benefits of both tax-exempt educational non-profits and lobbying groups.47 One 
interest group that specifically followed the AIPAC template was CANF. CANF 
followed this template and created three distinct branches within its organization: a 
political action committee, a lobbying entity, and the foundation itself.48 The political 
action committee can donate funds to campaigns or congressmen; the lobbying entity 
can lobby; and the main organization can conduct research and educate the public.49 
While AIPAC and CANF are not lobbying groups, their organization, as a whole, 
allows them to accomplish what normal lobbying groups can and more. 
 Both J-Street and AIPAC have a broad network of offices and a substantial 
number of staff. Both organizations claim to have over 100,000 members across the 
U.S. While, J-Street and AIPAC do not constitute the entirety of the pro-Israel lobby, 
they are a substantial part of the pro-Israel lobby. Also, they help demonstrate the 
varying structures of interest groups within the pro-Israel lobby. 
 Similar to the size of an interest group, the resources and lobbying ability are 
also important factors in determining the organizational strength of an interest group.50 
The pro-Israel lobby is widely known within the political arena to have substantial 
financial resources and lobbying ability. Specifically, AIPAC is recognized as one of 
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the key players in U.S. politics. In 2007, Representative Jim Moran recognized that 
AIPAC is widely known to be a key player in politics, “Every member knows it’s the 
best-organized national lobbying force.”51 Bill Clinton also acknowledged AIPAC as 
“stunningly effective” and “better than anyone at lobbying in [D.C.].”52 Even AIPAC, 
itself, recognized its strength through a quote posted on its website from the New York 
Times that called AIPAC “the most important organization affecting America’s 
relationship with Israel.”53 These are just a few testimonies to the strength and presence 
of AIPAC in politics. Mearsheimer and Walt present countless other testimonies to 
AIPAC’s political standing in the U.S.54 
 While AIPAC has had an established network in the United States for decades, 
J-Street has emerged as a significant player within the pro-Israel lobby. Both 
organizations are well organized and have access to many resources. Thus, they are 
prime examples of the organization factor required by Rubenzer. 
How fear of critical discourse about Israel limits political opposition 
Lack of political opposition can greatly affect the influence of an ethnic minority 
interest group. Often times interest groups can negate each other by providing 
contradicting narratives and support. If there are few groups that oppose a particular 
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interest group, the interest group is much more likely to have unchecked influence on 
policy.55 
The pro-Israel lobby has little outside political opposition. Part of this lack of 
political opposition may be contributed to a general fear of being accused of anti-
Semitism. Mearsheimer and Walt address this controversial topic in their discussion of 
the pro-Israel lobby and how fear of anti-Semitism accusations may sway public 
discourse about U.S.-Israeli foreign policy. They believe that many individuals are 
afraid to criticize acts by Israel because they fear that there will be political and social 
backlash. Once someone has been charged with being anti-Semitic it is difficult to 
prove the contrary. 
Accusations of anti-Semitism could play a substantial role in quelling political 
opposition. Mearsheimer and Walt raise many examples of instances where 
unsupported accusations of anti-Semitism are made.56 This supports the fact that there is 
little political opposition to the pro-Israel lobby in the U.S. because criticism of Israel 
and the pro-Israel lobby is politically dangerous and unpopular. If the pro-Israel lobby is 
able to paint criticism of Israel as inherently anti-Semitic, the lobby can make criticism 
of Israel a form of taboo.  
One example of taboo already related to Israel is Israel’s possession of nuclear 
weapons. The policy of amimut, the Hebrew word for opaque, is an agreement with 
Israel to not publicize the fact that Israel has nuclear weapons.57 The purpose of amimut 
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is to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East by denying and hiding 
the fact that Israel has nuclear weapons. While this may or may not have been a result 
of the pro-Israel lobby in the U.S.,58 it does demonstrate an example of taboo related to 
critiques of Israel and its capabilities. 
Another example is the outcry sparked by Representative Ilhan Omar’s 
comments about the Israel lobby. She posted a critical tweet claiming that support for 
Israel was “all about the Benjamins baby.”59 The statement was said to perpetuate a 
common negative stereotype that Jewish money plays a strong role in politics. The 
aftermath opened a rift in the Democratic party between those who support Omar and 
her statement and those who thought it demonstrated anti-Semitic themes. The 
controversy ultimately led to the introduction of an anti-Semitism resolution that 
condemns any accusation that American Jews may be more loyal to Israel than the 
United States.60 In addition to the resolution, President Trump, in a tweet, said that 
Jewish groups had sent a petition to Speaker Pelosi demanding the removal of 
Representative Omar from the Foreign Relations Committee.61 If successful, it would 
be a victory for the pro-Israel lobby and demonstrate their influence in Washington 
D.C.  
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Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren both supported Omar while also 
critiquing the anti-Semitism resolution. Senator Sanders said, “[W]hat’s going on in the 
house now is an effort to target Congresswoman Omar as a way of stifling that debate 
[about Israel policy].” Senator Warren followed suit by saying, “[B]randing criticism of 
Israel as automatically anti-Semitic has a chilling effect on our public discourse.”62 The 
comments made by Representative Ilhan Omar were not anti-Semitic. It is commonly 
recognized that interest groups often resort to campaign funding and lobbying to shape 
politics. The fact that it may have coincided with a negative Jewish stereotype is a 
coincidence. Her statements were addressing the use of money in politics, specifically, 
by interest groups. In this case she was addressing the influence of AIPAC, not the 
negative stereotype about Jews and money. 
J-Street, on its website, has addressed the issues that have arisen from criticism 
of Israeli policy and anti-Semitism accusations. As part of the pro-Israel lobby, one of J-
Street’s founding policies is that criticism of Israeli policy should be accepted and not 
shut down. It is important to distinguish between critical discourse surrounding the 
policies of Israel and discourse that questions Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state. 
Additionally, there should not be constraints on discussion of Israeli policies. Discourse 
should be encouraged and not shut down through fear or threats of anti-Semitism.63 
The fear of being accused as an anti-Semite, whether warranted or not, makes 
anti-Israel discourse unlikely and unpopular. There should undoubtedly be 
condemnations of white-supremacist groups that proliferate a false narrative and 
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damaging stereotypes about Jews. However, critical discussion about Israel should be 
permitted, to an extent, without fear of appearing anti-Semitic. Thus, there is little 
opposition to the pro-Israel lobby due, in part, to fear of political and social backlash. 
An expanding rift within the pro-Israel lobby 
 Political unification is another important factor in evaluating the influence of an 
ethnic minority interest group on foreign policy. Similar to the rationale behind political 
opposition, if there are fewer competing viewpoints and fighting within a lobby there is 
a greater chance to be influential.64 The pro-Israel lobby has faced a steadily widening 
divide as its members become more partisan.65 
Until recently, AIPAC has been the face of the pro-Israel lobby. The pro-Israel 
lobby had historically been more sympathetic to what the Israel government wanted and 
rarely differed from self-proclaimed Israeli interests. However, this changed with the 
increasing awareness of conflict between Palestinians and Israel. From that awareness, 
organizations like J-Street and IfNotNow took root in the policy areas that were largely 
underrepresented in the pro-Israel lobby. Instead of the usual conservative and pro-
Likud party policies of AIPAC, newer interest groups pushed for peace. While it was 
not the approach that the conservative Israeli government wanted, groups were still able 
to push for policies they believed were still beneficial for Israel. 
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Issue AIPAC66 J-Street67 
The Israel-Palestine two 
state solution 
Supports Supports 
Jerusalem should be 
recognized as Capital of 
Israel 
Supports Supports, but U.S. should 
have waited until after two 
state solution 
Special relationship 
between the United States 
and Israel 
Supports Supports, but should not 
undermine relations in the 
Middle East 
Boycott, divestment, and 
sanctions (BDS) 
movement 
Opposes Opposes, except BDS 
related to two-state 
solution 
Iran Nuclear Deal Opposes Supports 
 
Table 1: The Policy Stances of AIPAC and J-Street Regarding Issues Concerning Israel 
Observing the positions on issues concerning Israel, AIPAC and J-Street share 
many of the same viewpoints. J-Street and AIPAC mostly differ on how to address each 
issue but often share the same end goal. For example, the boycott, divestment, and 
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sanctions movement (BDS) has recently taken root with the purpose to pressure Israel 
through economic means. While both AIPAC and J-Street generally oppose BDS, J-
Street supports BDS that is targeted at promoting a two-state solution.68 Even though J-
Street often has a different proposed method of addressing issues concerning Israel, it 
shares many of the same general viewpoints with AIPAC. 
The major issue that AIPAC and J-Street disagree on is the Iran Nuclear Deal. 
The deal dropped economic sanctions against Iran if they agreed to not continue their 
nuclear weapons program. Israel’s right-wing government was clearly opposed to the 
Iran nuclear deal because they believed it would give Iran more power in the region 
without the added burden of economic sanctions. While AIPAC sides with Israel’s view 
of the deal, other pro-Israel interest groups like J-Street supported the deal.69 The more 
liberal interest groups supported the deal believing it would effectively stop Iran from 
getting nuclear weapons. They believed that if the nuclear weapons program continued 
there could be an increased chance of conflict between Israel, Iran and their allies. 
The 2016 Illinois Senate race between incumbent Senator Mark Kirk and 
Senator Tammy Duckworth demonstrated the conflict within the pro-Israel lobby 
concerning the Iran Nuclear Deal. Senator Duckworth is a veteran who lost both of her 
legs in the Iraq war and had previously served in the House as a representative from 
Illinois.70 Prior to the race for Senator Kirk’s Senate seat, Senator Duckworth was 
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undecided on her position on the Iran Nuclear Deal.71 However, in September 2016 
Senator Duckworth, along with other congressmen from Illinois, announced their 
support for the Iran Nuclear Deal. 
We live in serious times that call for serious, if imperfect, solutions. The 
only deal that works for the U.S. and our allies and stops Iran's nuclear 
program for nearly 15 years is the one before us. We urge our colleagues 
to join us in support of President Obama's accord with Iran.72 
Subsequently, in the 2016 Senate Race, Senator Duckworth received over $320,000 in 
funding from the liberal pro-Israel lobby.73 Her second highest contributor in the 2016 
election was J-Street who contributed over half of all the pro-Israel funding, $188,000.74 
Later, in 2018, Senator Duckworth received over $200,000 from J-Street.75 
On the other hand, the incumbent, Senator Mark Kirk, was staunchly opposed to 
the Iran Nuclear Deal. Senator Kirk believed that “the deal condemns the next 
generation to cleaning up a nuclear war in the Persian Gulf,” and “tens of thousands of 
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people in the Middle East are gonna lose their lives…”76 Senator Kirk continued by 
claiming that the Iran Nuclear Deal “is the greatest appeasement since Chamberlain 
gave Czechoslovakia to Hitler.”77 Senator Kirk received significant funding from the 
conservative pro-Israel lobby to the point where he was called “AIPAC’s Million Dollar 
Baby.”78 When Senator Kirk was a representative in the House, he received more 
funding than any other representative.79 He also introduced the Nuclear Weapons Free 
Iran Act of 2015 that restricted Obama’s ability to create a lasting nuclear deal with 
Iran.80 While Senator Duckworth ultimately won the 2016 Senate race, the race itself 
demonstrates the conflict within the pro-Israel lobby regarding the Iran Nuclear Deal.  
The Iran nuclear deal highlighted the growing divide within the pro-Israel lobby. 
The divide was based mostly on party affiliations: conservative versus liberal. In 
general, the liberal side of the pro-Israel lobby supported the deal, whereas the 
conservative side opposed the deal. Until this point there had been relative support from 
both sides of the political spectrum in regard to foreign policy concerning Israel.81 The 
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J-Street President, Jeremy Ben-Ami, noted the change within the pro-Israel lobby 
following the Iran nuclear deal, “The illusion that there’s some form of wall-to-wall 
unity and unanimity on these issues in the Jewish political community has probably 
been put to rest by this fight.”82 Thus, the debate over the Iran nuclear deal within the 
pro-Israel lobby demonstrates a growing rift and lack of political unity within the lobby.  
Considering the factors, the pro-Israel lobby is influential 
There is no set method to weigh each of the four factors; however, viewing these 
factors in the context of the pro-Israel lobby allows me to conclude that the Israel lobby 
is influential in respect to U.S. foreign policy. The four main factors I considered were 
involvement with foreign policy, organizational strength, political opposition, and 
political unification.  
First, the pro-Israel lobby is almost exclusively directed at foreign policy. 
Involvement with foreign policy is reflected in the primary issues referred to on the 
websites of interest groups within the pro-Israel lobby. Also, domestic U.S. policy has 
little effect on Israeli interests. Second, the organization and resources of J-Street and 
AIPAC demonstrate the strength and nationwide influence of the pro-Israel lobby. 
Third, political opposition to Israel is often limited because of the unpopularity and 
political backlash faced by those who are critical of Israel and the relationship between 
the U.S. and Israel. 
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 Finally, there is division growing in the pro-Israel lobby around the Iran nuclear 
deal. Until recently, the pro-Israel lobby has generally been cohesive in its policy 
positions. However, the Iran Nuclear Deal has exposed the growing divide and 
increasing partisanship in the pro-Israel lobby.  
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The Pro-Israel Lobby’s Influence on U.S. Involvement in the Iran 
Nuclear Deal 
Following my analysis of the influence of the pro-Israel lobby on foreign policy 
generally, I investigate the circumstances surrounding the creation of the Iran Nuclear 
Deal and its ultimate demise. First, I provide a background on the context and structure 
of the Iran Nuclear Deal. Next, I examine how parts of the conservative pro-Israel lobby 
prevented Congress from approving economic sanctions against Iran and convinced 
President Trump to leave the deal.  
The structure of the Iran Nuclear Deal 
Before I begin my analysis, it is important to understand the context and 
structure of the JCPOA. The P5+1 (Germany, United States, Russia, China, France, and 
the U.K.), realizing the danger of an Iranian nuclear weapons program, developed and 
signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. The JCPOA, 
commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal, strictly regulated all Iranian nuclear 
enrichment facilities and the disposal of spent fuel from enrichment processes. The 
main goal of the JCPOA was to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon while 
allowing it to both enrich uranium for civilian power reactors and have economic 
sanctions dropped to give Iran access to Western markets.83  
The JCPOA is an international agreement; therefore, there is no international 
government that can enforce or regulate the agreement. The anarchic nature of 
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international relations can make it difficult to create and enforce deals between states 
because there is no global authority that can enforce international agreements. While the 
U.N. can help coerce and convince states to follow through with their agreements, it 
relies heavily on its member states to use sanctions and other diplomatic routes to 
penalize states for breaking agreements. To make matters more complicated, each 
individual state part of the deal usually has to have its portion of the deal approved by 
its respective legislature. This is especially important for the various economic 
sanctions that the P5+1 had imposed on Iran. For example, Obama was able to approve 
the JCPOA and agree to its terms; however, Congress could pass legislation that would 
prevent the president from dropping economic sanctions against Iran in order to comply 
with the JCPOA. My research primarily looks at the domestic influences on proposed 
bills to drop economic sanctions against Iran and influence on President Trump who 
unilaterally left the JCPOA in 2018. 
The conservative pro-Israel lobby in action 
Due to the structure of the Iran Nuclear Deal, parts of the pro-Israel lobby 
opposed to the JCPOA had two courses of action to end U.S. involvement in the deal: 
prevent Congress from dropping economic sanctions against Iran or convince President 
Trump to leave the deal. Ultimately, both were successful. While there is nothing that 
definitively shows that the pro-Israel lobby was the reason for these decisions, there is 
ample evidence the pro-Israel lobby opposed to the Iran Nuclear Deal fought fiercely to 
limit and stop it. 
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Non-monetary methods of stalling the Iran Nuclear Deal 
As I previously discussed, there are alternate ways for ethnic minority groups to 
influence legislation. While money can be influential, there can also be political means 
of influence. However, alternative political influence is difficult to find and gauge. 
Usually, it is required to talk directly with officials or have officials speak out about 
forms of influence that are not obvious. However, this is rare because of the fear of 
backlash from parts of the pro-Israel lobby. For example, Representative Ilhan Omar, a 
member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, has faced political backlash from 
the pro-Israel community. According to President Trump, Jewish groups sent a petition 
demanding that Representative Omar no longer serve on the committee because of her 
controversial comments about AIPAC.84 The Jewish groups were not directing money 
to persuade others to remove Representative Omar; instead, they wielded their general 
influence in foreign policy to create a threat to someone who spoke out.  
As I demonstrated earlier, speaking out against Israel or the pro-Israel lobby can 
often result in significant social and political backlash. The pro-Israel lobby 
purposefully wields its influence in U.S. politics to deter opposition. The case of 
Representative Omar acts as a warning to other politicians that openly oppose some 
pro-Israel policy. It is especially significant that she is a member of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs because it may lead other members of the committee to 
think twice before opposing pro-Israel policy or the pro-Israel lobby. 
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Fighting the Iran Nuclear Deal with money 
One way to fight the Iran Nuclear Deal was to appeal directly to the public. 
AIPAC, through one of its spinoff groups Citizens for a Nuclear-Free Iran, dedicated up 
to $40 million to run ads opposing the deal.85 AIPAC and its allies purchased 
advertisements combatting the Iran Nuclear Deal in 23 states.86 The advertisements 
addressed the shortcomings of the Iran Nuclear Deal, specifically calling attention to 
Iran’s support of terrorist groups and the weaknesses of the deal. Ultimately, these 
advertisements called for an end to the Iran Nuclear Deal. 
Another approach that interest groups take to influence legislation is through 
monetary contributions. Typically, these contributions are made to congressional or 
presidential campaigns. Also, interest groups often direct funds to ranking members and 
chairmen of committees and subcommittees. Members of congressional committees can 
be very influential in the development of bills and can either assist or impede the ability 
for certain legislation to make it to the floor of the House or the Senate. Interest groups 
often note the voting habits of particular members of foreign relation committees in 
both the Senate and House and apportion funds accordingly.87 
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Based on the strategy of interest groups to target committees, I investigated the 
funding of members and chairmen of the foreign relation committees in both the House 
and the Senate. I selected these committees because they are particularly influential and 
would be heavily involved in any legislation surrounding the JCPOA.88 Specifically, I 
found that Robert Menendez, the ranking member and former chair of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, received substantial funding from the pro-Israel 
Lobby. According to the Center for Responsive Politics,89 Senator Menendez received 
$1.3 million in funding from pro-Israel groups throughout his career.90 In 2018 alone, 
Senator Menendez received $550,000 in funding from pro-Israel groups and 
individuals.91 Additionally, a former president of AIPAC, David Steiner, contributed to 
Senator Menendez’s legal fund, which was used to help address legal costs related to a 
corruption investigation.92 
Other members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations also received 
considerable funding from the pro-Israel lobby. Majority member John Barrasso 
received $117,000 from the pro-Israel in 2018 and $217,000 in his entire career; 
Senator Rob Portman received over $330,000; Senator Todd Young received $209,000; 
Senator Ted Cruz received over $800,000; Senator Ben Cardin received $916,000; 
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Senator Jeanne Shaheen received $475,000; Senator Tim Kaine received $470,000; 
Senator Jeff Merkley received $231,000; and Senator Cory Booker received $445,000.93 
Nearly half of the twenty members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations have 
received substantial funding from the pro-Israel lobby.94  
Looking at the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, there is a similar trend. 
Like the ex-chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Robert 
Menendez, the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign affairs, Eliot Engel has 
also received significant funding from the pro-Israel lobby. In his career, he has 
received over $1 million from the pro-Israel lobby.95 Some other members have also 
received funding: Representative Brad Sherman received almost $500,000; 
Representative Theodore Deutch received $600,000; and Representative Lee Zeldin 
received $330,000. While there were fewer members receiving funding from the pro-
Israel lobby compared to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the chairman and 
multiple members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs received substantial 
funding from the pro-Israel lobby. 
Although the reason behind funding specific senators is not explicitly stated; the 
directing of funds to members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs indicates the focus of the pro-Israel lobby, 
especially in regard to the Iran Nuclear Deal. In 2016, after Obama entered the Iran 
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Nuclear Deal, funding from the pro-Israel lobby jumped from $12 million to nearly 
$15.5 million.96 While it cannot be shown whether all of these funds were used to 
inhibit or prevent the Iran Nuclear Deal, there is a correlation between entry into the 
JCPOA, in 2015, and a subsequent increase in spending by the pro-Israel lobby. 
During 2015 there were various attempts to prevent President Obama from 
dropping economic sanctions against Iran. Normally, the president is given discretion to 
handle matters concerning foreign policy and diplomacy.97 However, the Supreme 
Court has found that there are varying degrees of presidential power. If the president 
has express congressional approval, he has the most power. If Congress is silent on the 
issue or does not expressly approve or disapprove, the president must rely on past 
express powers or constitutional powers. However, this area of presidential power is 
still a gray area. The lowest form of presidential power is when Congress has expressly 
disapproved of presidential action.98 Thus, resolutions of disapproval or approval can 
affect the discretion given to presidential action. 
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 99 
Figure 1: Justice Jackson’s Three Tiers of Presidential Power 
The first attempt to prevent the development of an agreement with Iran was the 
Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act of 2015, which was proposed on January 27, 2015. The 
act would have required President Obama to reach an agreement by June 30, 2015, and 
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present the text of the agreement to Congress within five days after reaching an 
agreement. If these terms were not met, there would be additional sanctions imposed on 
Iran.100 The act was proposed by Representative Mark Kirk who has received nearly 
$2.3 million from the conservative pro-Israel lobby, the most funding received by any 
Republican.101 Following his time in Congress, Mark Kirk now serves on the advisory 
board of United Against Nuclear Iran because of his dedication to supporting sanctions 
against Iran.102 The fact that Mark Kirk currently serves on the board of  United Against 
Nuclear Iran demonstrates that he supported the conservative pro-Israel lobby that was 
opposed to the Iran Nuclear Deal. Ultimately the act was never voted on; however, it 
did lay the groundwork for future attempts. 
Exactly a month later, the Iran Nuclear Review Act of 2015 was proposed. The 
act was proposed by former chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator 
Bob Corker.103 Senator Corker has received $167,000 from the pro-Israel lobby 
throughout his time in Congress.104 The act required the executive branch to verify that 
Iran had not taken any additional steps to further their nuclear weapons program or 
participated in acts of terrorism against the U.S. or its citizens. Additionally, the act 
prohibited the president from lifting sanctions against Iran for 60 days.105 The house 
unanimously approved the bill and the senate approved the bill with a 98-1 vote.106  
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Following the 60-day review period, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell 
proposed an amendment to disapprove of the Iran Nuclear Deal by attaching it to the 
Hire More Heroes Act of 2015, which was originally proposed in the House.107 
Democrats filibustered the act and the amendment three times and the measure failed by 
just two votes.108  
The next day, on September 9, 2015, there were various attempts made to limit 
the President’s ability to lift sanctions against Iran. First, a resolution was proposed in 
the House asserting that President Obama had not submitted the JCPOA to Congress 
and, therefore, had violated the Iran Nuclear Agreement Act of 2015.109 The resolution 
passed, along party lines, 245-186.110 Next, the Speaker of the House John Boehner 
introduced a resolution in the House to approve the JCPOA. The House, a few days 
later, voted against the resolution of approval 162-269.111 Even though the Senate was 
unable to pass a vote of disapproval, the House was unable to pass a resolution 
approving the deal. Thus, there was no congressional consensus on the JCPOA.  
The clearest attempt to undermine the JCPOA was the introduction of a bill on 
September 9, 2015, in the House that would prevent President Obama from lifting any 
sanctions against Iran until January 21, 2017.112 Inauguration day is typically held on 
January 20th; thus, the purpose was to prevent President Obama from lifting any 
sanctions on Iran throughout the duration of his final term. The bill was introduced by 
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Representative Peter Roskam who has received nearly $420,000 from the pro-Israel 
lobby throughout his career.113 Ultimately, the bill was approved by the House with a 
vote of 247-186. However, it was successfully filibustered by Democrats in the Senate. 
The fact that AIPAC was unable to secure enough votes to ensure a resolution of 
disapproval was touted as a failure.114 Some members of Congress felt that AIPAC had 
overstepped and appeared too partisan in regard to the Iran Nuclear Deal.115 Part of this 
sentiment was due to the speech given by Prime Minister Netanyahu in front of 
Congress in March 2015. Representative Steve Cohen, a House Democrat, said, 
“Having [Netanyahu] come and try to influence the members of the Congress and lobby 
against what the president was working on set the tenor….Netanyahu should not get 
himself involved in American politics in the future, and AIPAC played a stronger hand 
than they should have.”116 Netanyahu had spoken at an AIPAC conference the night 
before and was invited to speak in front of Congress without President Obama’s 
approval.117 While AIPAC was not directly involved with organizing the speech, many 
members of Congress believed that AIPAC was abandoning a bipartisan strategy that 
had led to its success.118 Thus, valuable Democrat votes that could have been used to 
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inhibit the Iran Nuclear Deal were lost due to the increasingly partisan nature of 
AIPAC. 
Even though the attempts to prevent President Obama from lifting sanctions 
against Iran ultimately did not succeed, there was still no express approval or 
disapproval by Congress. The lack of a Congressional approval or disapproval, 
considering Justice Jackson’s categories of presidential power, meant that President 
Obama fell into the second tier of presidential power. Thus, he could not rely on express 
Congressional approval to justify his actions. Instead he had to rely on past power that 
had been delegated to him and the Constitutional powers the president holds under 
Article III of the Constitution. Ultimately, President Obama relied on prior legislation 
that granted the president limited power to impose and drop sanctions against foreign 
countries.119 Also, Congress’s decision to neither approve the deal nor disapprove of the 
deal left the door open for future presidents to take unilateral action concerning the Iran 
Nuclear Deal. 
Convincing President Trump to leave the deal 
The alternative method to stop the Iran Nuclear Deal was to persuade President 
Trump to leave the deal. President Trump could unilaterally decide to leave the deal as 
long Congress did not take action to enact the terms of the deal domestically. Because 
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Congress had neither approved nor disapproved of the deal, President Trump had 
enough power to leave the deal unilaterally.  
Much of President Trump’s campaign funding came from members of the pro-
Israel lobby who were opposed to the Iran Nuclear Deal. The top contributor to 
President Trump’s campaign, Renaissance Technologies, donated $15.5 million to his 
campaign and PACs.120 Until recently, Renaissance Technologies was run by billionaire 
Robert Mercer. Mercer was opposed to the Iran Nuclear Deal and even directed an 
additional $2 million to the John Bolton Super PAC, which promotes hawkish foreign 
policy.121  
In addition to Mercer, Sheldon Adelson is another billionaire contributor who is 
opposed to the Iran Nuclear Deal. Adelson contributed $5 million to President Trump’s 
inaugural committee, which was the largest individual donation ever made to a 
presidential inaugural committee.122 Adelson was also the second-highest spender 
during the 2016 federal elections. He donated $83 million to support Republicans who 
were running.123 Not only has Adelson contributed significantly to President Trump and 
Republican candidates and incumbents, but he is an avid supporter of Israel and a 
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foreign policy hawk.124 He has been especially hawkish in regard to the Iranian nuclear 
program. At a talk in 2013, Adelson said diplomacy to stop Iran’s nuclear program 
would be ineffective. Instead, the U.S. should fire a warning shot, in the form of a 
nuclear missile, in a sparsely populated part of Iran to show Iran that the U.S. meant 
business.125 
Due to his policy stances, Adelson has been actively involved in the pro-Israel 
lobby. He has spent $100 million to support trips by young Jewish Americans to Israel, 
supported groups that oppose the BDS movement, and even paid for a new headquarters 
for AIPAC.126 Additionally, Adelson provided $500,000 to United Against Nuclear Iran 
(UANI) to help fight the Iran Nuclear Deal with a multimillion-dollar ad campaign.127 
His contribution was nearly one-third of the entire UANI budget.128 
Many of President Trump’s foreign policy decisions have paralleled Adelson’s 
views; specifically, the appointment of John Bolton as National Security Advisor, 
moving the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, and the decision to leave the Iran 
                                                        
124 Kenneth P. Vogel, “Meet the Members of the ‘Shadow N.S.C.’ Advising John 
Bolton,” The New York Times, May 21, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/21/us/politics/advising-bolton-a-shadow-
nsc-of-cronies.html. 
125 Connor Simpson, “Sheldon Adelson Has an Idea: Lob a Nuclear Bomb into the 
Iranian Desert,” The Atlantic, October 23, 2013, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/10/sheldon-adelson-
has-idea-lob-nuclear-bomb-iranian-desert/309657/. 
126 Chris McGreal, “Sheldon Adelson: The Casino Mogul Driving Trump’s Middle 
East Policy,” The Guardian, June 8, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2018/jun/08/sheldon-adelson-trump-middle-east-policy. 
127 Jett, The Iran Nuclear Deal: Bombs, Bureaucrats, and Billionaires, 91. 
128 Jett, 91. 
  
44 
 
Nuclear Deal.129 Adelson even held a private meeting with President Trump, Vice 
President Mike Pence, and John Bolton just one day after President Trump announced 
he would exit the Iran Nuclear Deal.130 Generally, President Trump has aligned himself 
with the conservative pro-Israel lobby that is opposed to the Iran Nuclear Deal. His 
allegiance was made apparent early in his candidacy during a speech to AIPAC in 
March of 2016. Early in his speech, President Trump said, “My number-one priority is 
to dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran.”131 He continued by criticizing the structure 
of the deal and the danger imposed by allowing sanctions to be dropped against Iran.132 
President Trump wanted to make his intentions clear and make a case for receiving 
support from the pro-Israel lobby opposed to the Iran Nuclear Deal. 
Thanks in part to Sheldon Adelson, National Security Advisor John Bolton is 
now one of President Trump’s most important foreign policy advisors.133 Initially, 
President Trump passed over John Bolton and instead chose General H.R. McMaster to 
be his National Security Advisor. President Trump, an isolationist, felt that John Bolton 
was too hawkish and decided McMaster would appear more professional. However, 
McMaster was not as friendly to Israel and often dodged questions about Israeli 
security.134 Also, McMaster had convinced President Trump on multiple occasions to 
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remain in the Iran Nuclear Deal.135 Bolton, on the other hand, wholeheartedly supported 
Israel and its security in the Middle East. Because of McMasters perceived hostility to 
Israel, the head of the Zionist Organization of America, Mort Klein, and Adelson 
teamed up to try and replace McMaster. Klein said, “We were pushing for [McMaster] 
to be fired.”136 President Trump proceeded to fire McMaster and replace him with John 
Bolton, despite President Trump’s previous inhibitions.137 The decision to fire 
McMaster and replace him with John Bolton was due, in part, to the influence by key 
members of the pro-Israel lobby opposed to the Iran Nuclear Deal. 
Bolton has been openly opposed to the Iranian regime for many years.138 He has 
even regularly advocated for active regime change lead by the U.S.139 However, one of 
the primary reasons behind John Bolton’s hatred of the Iranian regime is their nuclear 
weapons program. When asked about his focus on Iran as an enemy to the United 
States, Bolton said, “I care about Iran because I care about nuclear weapons.”140 Bolton 
has been fervently opposed to the Iran Nuclear Deal since its conception and has called 
the deal “execrable.”141 Just one month after Bolton became National Security Advisor, 
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President Trump announced that it would leave the Iran Nuclear Deal.142 A framed copy 
of President Trump’s executive order announcing to leave the Iran Nuclear Deal hangs 
in John Bolton’s office, a trophy of Bolton’s success.143 
The combination of external and internal influence was enough to persuade 
President Trump to leave the Iran Nuclear Deal. Campaign donations and funding set 
President Trump on a path towards appeasing the pro-Israel lobby by exiting the Iran 
Nuclear Deal. But, the nail in the coffin was replacing General H.R. McMaster with 
John Bolton as National Security Advisor, all but ensuring the fate of the Iran Nuclear 
Deal. 
Stalling the Iran Nuclear Deal until it could be stopped 
The pro-Israel lobby through its spending in Congress was able to stall domestic 
action and prevent explicit congressional approval of the Iran Nuclear Deal long enough 
to allow President Trump to unilaterally leave the deal. While President Trump had the 
final say in the demise of the Iran Nuclear Deal, the pro-Israel lobby was able to exert 
its influence over domestic politics until a president could be persuaded to leave the 
deal. Following the end of the Iran Nuclear Deal there still remains uncertainty around 
nuclear weapons and Iran; however, one factor remains constant: the presence of the 
pro-Israel lobby in U.S. foreign policy. 
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